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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF
COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the aboveentitled case because it involves the conviction of the Appellant
on the charge of Unlawful Possession Of A Controlled Substance
With Intent To Distribute For Value, a second degree felony.

The

conviction occurred in the Third District Court and jurisdiction
is granted the Utah Court of Appeals by U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The nature of the proceedings is that of a criminal case
brought by the State of Utah against the Appellant and involved a
conviction on a felony of the second degree pursuant to U.C.A.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (as amended, 1953).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review in this Appeal:
1.

The affidavit in support of the search warrant is

insufficient because it fails to establish the reliability or
veracity of either confidential informant as required by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
2.

The evidence seized from the Appellant's person should

be suppressed because the search violated his Constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
3.

The seizure of united states currency and a soft plastic

bag containing balloons with a powdery substance was not a

legitimate seizure pursuant to a "pat down" search.
4.

All alleged incriminating statements of the Appellant

should be suppressed since Appellant could not speak English well
enough to understand the nature of his Miranda rights, nor to
enter valid waiver thereto.
5.

Statements made by the Appellant after he invoked his

Fifth Amendment right to remain silent should be suppressed.
6.

Appellant's statements were "fruit of the poisonous

tree" and should be suppressed.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
OR ORDINANCES AND RULES SET OUT VERBATIM
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized*
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated; and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-7-16:
Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for
dangerous weapon — Grounds. A peace officer
who has stopped a person temporarily for
questioning may frisk the person for a
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes
he or any other person is in danger.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal in a criminal case from a judgment of conviction entered against the Appellant for the offense of Unlawful
Possession Of A Controlled Substance With Intent To Distribute For
Value by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on October 30, 1987.
In the lower court proceedings, Appellant filed a Motion to
Suppress Evidence on April 14, 1986 and the court granted in part
and denied in part said Motion on July 22, 1986.

Further, on

August 19, 1987, Appellant filed a Motion To Clarify Court Ruling
On Suppression of Evidence and said Motion was denied by the
court on or about September 28, 1987. The effect of the disposition of these orders was that certain evidence was introduced at
trial and used against Appellant by the State.

The Notice of

Appeal was filed in the Utah Court of Appeals on December 1, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 14, 1986, an affidavit for search
warrant was signed under oath before the Honorable Sheila K.
McCleve, a magistrate for the Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, by Detective John Conforti of the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office (See Affidvait For Search
Warrant, Addendum, Exhibit A ) . Judge McCleve on January 14,
1986 then issued a search warrant for the premises known as
88 53 Julia Lane (3255 South) in the City of Salt Lake, County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah (See Addendum, Exhibit B ) .
Pursuant to said search warrant, deputies of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office assisted by other police agencies,

arrived at the Julia Lane residence on or about January 15, 1986
at approximately 9:00 p.m.

Upon arriving, Officers under the

direction of Detective Conforti, began a search of the residence.
Officer James Upton found a .38 caliber pistol under a bed between a mattress and box spring in the residence.

In the closet

of a bedroom, he found five rounds of .357 caliber ammunition
wrapped up in a sock; said ammunition was not usable in the
pistol found.

No other guns or ammunition were found in the

residence (R. 285 p. 6, 12, 15). Officer Upton also searched the
bedroom, described to be the North bedroom, and found two
balloons within a plastic-like baggie material containing a black
tar substance suspected to be heroin, as well as a syringe and
silver colored metal canister (R. 285 p. 8 ) . Officer Upton was
still in the process of his search in the North bedroom, and
there was no evidence that he had found the heroin, when the
Appellant and two other individuals arrived (R. 285 p. 11, 14).
Appellant's arrival was approximately 9:55 p.m.; and upon his
arrival, Detective Conforti testified that Appellant stated, "I
live here, what's going on?" (R. 285 p. 25). Appellant testified
that when he arrived at his home that evening, police officers
pulled him by the hair and threw him up against a wall with
pistols to his back and searched him (R. 283 p. 41-42).

One

police officer shouted, "Bingo" as they searched his pockets.

He

was never informed what was found in his pockets and could not
see what the police were pulling from them (R.283 p. 42). In
fact, Detective Conforti and the other officers removed 96 common

balloons containing a white powdery substance in a cellophane bag
from one jacket pocket and $1,320.00 in cash apparently distributed between a second jacket pocket and a pants pocket (R. 28 5
p. 28). Detective Conforti testified that the search was conducted only for the officers1 safety and because weapons had been
found in the house.

Detective Conforti specifically admitted he

withdrew the "soft" money and balloons from Appellant's pocket
while searching for weapons (R. 285 p. 43-44).
In the preliminary hearing in the matter, a transcript of
which was used as evidence in the Motion To Suppress hearing held
on or about July 22, 1986, (for which said preliminary hearing
testimony was considered by the court by stipulation of the parties) (R. 284 p. 27, 42, 43), Detective Conforti had testified,
"Initially I was conducting the search for weapons because we had
found a hand gun in the house already.

After it was determined

that he was a resident of the house, I felt that he fell under the
jurisdiction of the search warrant in conducting a more thorough
search." (R. 168). Of course, the search warrant in the officers1
possession did not contain authorization to search any particular
person, or even residents of the house in question (See Addendum,
Exhibit B).

After the search of the Appellant, he was Mirandized

and the search of the house continued (R. 285 p. 35).
A further search of the house turned up $9,550.00 in cash in
a kitchen drawer (R. 285 p. 37). Another individual who came to
the house and was arrested had $7,250.00 in cash removed from his
person (R. 285 p. 63). A third individual was searched and 23

packets of heroin were found on his person (R. 285 p. 51).
Another individual who arrived at the house was searched and a
"hype kit and rolling papers" were taken from his person (R. 285
p. 63).
Defense counsel appropriately objected to testimony concerning the introduction of not only the evidence found on
Appellant's person, but the use of the evidence found in the home
and on the persons of all the other defendants, both in a pretrial motion to suppress evidence and again at trial (R. 37, 39,
285 p. 12, 13, 34, 53, 54, 63, 77).
Appellant testified that he had only been staying at the
Julia Lane house approximately 7-8 days when his arrest occurred
(R. 283 p. 31). During that time, he slept on the couch in the
living room (R. 283 p.32).

Also at that time, he met the other

arrested individuals at the house for the first time (R. 283 p.
34).

Appellant denys ever seeing large sums of money in the

house (R. 283 p. 36), and testified that he had never seen the
package of 96 balloons prior to having them pulled from the
jacket and did not know there was a large amount of cash in the
jacket pocket.

He testified he only had $25.00 in his pants

pocket (R. 283 p. 37).
Appellant further testified that he had gone to a Mexican
restaurant to eat on the night of January 15, 1986 with two other
residents of the home who were also arrested, and had been given
a coat by co-defendant Roberto Villalobos to put on since it was
cold and he had not brought his own coat.

He had only had Mr.

Villalobos1 coat on for a short time prior to arriving at the
house and had not looked in the pockets of the coat (R. 283 p. 40).
After being searched by police officers at the Julia Lane residence , he was then taken into the North bedroom and was
questioned by police officers (R. 283 p.42).
Initially, Appellant told Detective Conforti and other officers he did not wish to answer questions (R. 284 p. 29). The
Appellant testified that while he understood some English, he did
not understand the language very well and had to ask police officers to repeat their questions and statements to him when they
resumed questioning.

He further pretended to understand what he

was being told and tried to give the answers the police officers
wanted even though he did not fully understand the questions (R.
283 p. 43, 44; R. 284 P. 12, 13). Appellant denied understanding
the "Miranda warning" and denied he understood he had a right to
an attorney (R. 284 p. 11; R. 283 p. 43, 44).
Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecuting attorney
asked Appellant on cross-examination about a conversation he had
had with an Officer Jay Labrum, who had transported him to jail
that night (R. 283 p. 87-91).

Appellant talked about the conver-

sation with Officer Labrum only after the court had overruled
defense counsel's objection, which was later properly put on the
record outside the presence of the jury (R. 283 p. 58, 59, 72,
83, 89).
Officer Jay Labrum was then called to testify in rebuttal by
the State of Utah and Officer Labrum related statements made by

the Appellant in response to questions by him as he was transporting the Appellant to jail on the night in question (R. 283 p.
98, 99). Among such statements allegedly made to Officer Labrum
were statements by the Appellant that he had been selling "dope"
and he had made $15,000.00 over the past six months (R. 283 p. 90).
In addition, Appellant allegedly said defendant Villalobos was
holding his money, (approximately $7,250.00 was found on the person of defendant Villalobos) (R. 283 p. 91). Appellant's attorney strenuously objected to the admission of such evidence (R.
283 p. 89). Appellant was ultimately convicted by the jury of
the offense of Possession Of A Controlled Substance With Intent
To Distribute For Value, and was sentenced by the court to an
indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen
(15) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 267).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The affidavit in support of the search warrant is insufficient because it fails to establish the reliability or veracity
of either confidential informant as required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution.
The evidence seized from the Appellant's person should be
suppressed because the search violated his constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The seizure of united states currency and a soft plastic bag
containing balloons with a powdery substance was not a legitimate

seizure pursuant to a "pat down" search.
All alleged incriminating statements of the Appellant should
be suppressed since Appellant could not speak english well enough
to understand the nature of his Miranda rights, nor to enter
valid waiver thereto.
Statements made by the Appellant after he invoked his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent should be suppressed.
Appellant's statements were "fruit of the poisonous tree"
and should be suppressed.

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT IS
INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE
RELIABILITY OR VERACITY OF EITHER CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The test for determining the sufficiency of an affidavit
based on an informant's tip was established by the United States
Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969 ) f which holds:
The Fourth Amendment requires that affidavits
based on informant's tips must set out
'underlying circumstances' sufficient (1) to
reveal the basis of informant's knowledge and
(2) to establish the veracity of the informant
or alternativelyf the reliability of his report
in a particular case.
State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984)
(citing Aguilar - Spinelli.)
The United States Supreme Court recently modified the twoprong Aguilar - Spinelli test in favor of a "totality of the circumstances" test adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 46 2 U.S. 213
(1983).

Under Gates, the Aguilar - Spinelli test is not to be

"mechanically applied" but is to be more flexible by allowing a
magistrate to make a "common sense" decision based on the circumstances put forth in the affidavit.

Gates, at 232.

In other

words, a deficiency in one prong can arguably be overcome by a
strong showing as to the other prong.

Many courts have flatly refused to "follow blindly, the
lead of the United States Supreme Court" in Gates, and have preferred to follow the "established jurisprudence of Aguilar Spinelli which requires that each prong have "independent" status
in insuring the validity of the information.

State v. Jackson,

688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984). The Utah Supreme Court has also
refused to abandon the Aguilar - Spinelli test realizing that a
"common sense" decision still requires a consideration of both
veracity and basis of knowledge:
However, even under this standard compliance with
the Aguilar - Spinelli guidelines may be necessary
to make a sufficient basis for probable cause. . .
a showing of the basis of knowledge and veracity
or reliability of the person providing the
information for a warrant may well be necessary
to establish with a 'fair probability1 that the
evidence sought actually exists and can be found
where the informant states.
State v. Bailey, supra, at 120 5.
See also, State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985).
In both Bailey and Anderson the Utah Supreme Court found
that there were sufficient underlying circumstances to support
the reliability and credibility of the informant.

The criteria

relied upon by the court in arriving at that conclusion is
completely absent in the affidavit for search warrant in the
instant case.

The information offered to establish the reliabi-

lity of confidential informant #1, set forth in the affidavit is
as follows:

Another C.I. (#2) has stated that drugs,
specifically heroin is and has been sold
out of the residence of 8853 Julia Lane
for some time.
(See Appendix A ) .
There is no information offered whatsoever to establish the basis
of knowledge, veracity, or reliability of confidential informant
#2, yet his information is used as the sole basis for confidential
informant #l's reliability.

Under both Aguilar - Spinelli and

Gates, confidential informant #2's information is insufficient.
Confidential informant #2's information can't be used to support
the reliability or veracity of confidential informant #1 without
some basis for confidential informant #2's knowledge, reliability
or veracity.
The criteria the Utah Supreme Court looked to in determining
whether the affidavits in Bailey and Anderson supported the
informant's veracity is whether the informant had previously
given truthful information to the police concerning the existence
of contraband.

Bailey, at 1206; Anderson, at 1102.

An infor-

mant's "track record" is an accepted method for establishing his
veracity.

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).

The infor-

mant's "track record" refers to whether "he has provided accurate
information to the police a number of times in the past." State
v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984).
No "track record" is provided in the affidavit in this case.
At the time the search warrant was sought, Deputy Conforti states
that confidential informant #1 had been used for one week., Even

if this information had been in the affidavit, under Bailey and
Anderson "one week" would not constitute a "track record."
Moreover, there is no conceivable way the officer's testimony at
the preliminary hearing or trial can now be used to support the
information in the affidavit when it was initially a prerequisite
to obtaining the warrant.
As to verification, the only information offered to support
confidential informant #l's information is its corroboration by
yet another confidential informant for which there is no basis of
knowledge, reliability or veracity.

By contrast, in Bailey and

Anderson there was "verification of significant facts" by the
officers.

In Bailey, the affidavit "carefully set out and out-

lines the sources of verification of each factor."
106.

Bailey at

In Anderson, the police had verified "all but one piece of

information" received from the informant.

Anderson, at 1102.

Moreover, in Bailey, the reliability of the informant's statement
was supported by the "detail" with which he described his
"personal observation".

Bailey, at 106.

Understandably, the

magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable
cause existed.
In this case, the magistrate was provided no basis.

It is

almost impossible to ever test the sufficiency of the affidavit
because it is so completely void of the standard requirements
viewed by the court.

It sets forth no "track record," no

"verifiction of significant facts," and no "detailed personal
observations."

In short, neither prong of Aguilar - Spinelli is

met, making the affidavit insufficient under Bailey and Anderson,
As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Anderson:
"The basis of the affiant's knowledge must be
set forth in the affidavit together with some
evidence supporting the veracity of the
informant when the affidavit includes allegations of a confidential informant. Without
such a foundation, a warrant becomes a "mere
charade" and the basic liberty protected by
the Fourth Amendment would constitute an
unenforceable right or more realistically,
no right at all."
Anderson, at 1103 (Stewart J. Concurring).
The court's error in issuing the search warrant due to the
insufficient affidavit in this case was amplified by the court's
denial of Appellant's motion to disclose the names of the two
unnamed confidential informants (R. 85, R. 91). Despite counsel's reference to the "legendary" case of Cannon v. Keller,
692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984), the record does not reflect an adequate
showing by the State of harm from disclosure, and Appellant maintains that the lower court's failure to disclose the names of the
confidential informants relied upon compounded Judge McCleve's
error is issuing the search warrant, and violated Appellant's
Constitutional rights as indicated previously.

II.

THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE APPELLANT'S
PERSON SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE SEARCH
VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . .
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
therefore

U.S. Const. Art. IV.

It is

a well-established rule that a warrant authorizing the

search of a premises does not extend to authorize the search of a
person found on the premises.
92 (1979).

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,

Though Ybarra involved the unauthorized search of a

person in a public tavern while executing a warrant to search the
premises, the rule applies equally to persons found on "private"
premises.

State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982); State v.

Rollie, 701 P.2d 1123 (Wash.Ct. App. 1985); State v. Lambert, 38
CRL 2265 (Kan.Sup.Ct. Dec. 1985); State v. Weber, 668 P.2d 475
(Or.Ct.App. 1983).
The Ybarra rule is subject only to two exceptions. First,
when officers have a reasonable suspicion that an individual is
armed and dangerous, the individual may be "patted down" for
weapons.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

The scope of a

search for weapons is limited to a "patting of the outer clothing
of the suspect for concealed objects capable of use as instruments of assault."
392 U.S. 40 (1968)).

Broadnax, at 100 (citing Sibron v. New York,
The second exception to Ybarra allows offi-

cers to "detain" an "occupant" of the premises while executing a

warrant to search the premises for contraband.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1980).

Michigan v.

A "search" of a person is

authorized under Summers only if (1) the search of the premises
results in evidence establishing probable cause to arrest that
person, and (2) that person has in fact been arrested.

Summers,

at 695-96, n.4.
In this case, a search warrant was issued which authorized
only a search of the "premises" where the Appellant resided. No
person is named in the warrant or the affidavit supporting the
warrant. (App. B). Under Ybarra, the Appellant then could not be
searched pursuant to the warrant.

Because a gun had been found

on the premises, arguably a pat down frisk of the Appellant was
justified under the Terry exception.

However, there were other

occupants in the house and no reason to believe the gun belonged
to the Appellant.
According to Deputy Conforti's testimony, the Appellant was
"initially" searched for weapons and none was found.

(R. 168).

Then, the Appellant was searched further under the mistaken
belief that such a search was authorized by the warrant.

Deputy

Conforti stated that "after it was determined that he (Ayala) was
a resident of the house, I felt that he fell under the jurisdiction of the search warrant in conducting a more thorough search."
(R. 168). Under no circumstances does an individual "fall under
the jurisdiction of a warrant" unless they are named in the
warrant.

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has con-

tinuously rejected the argument that evidence searches of persons

who are on the premises subject to a search warrant should be
permitted where police have a "reasonable belief that such persons" are connected with 'drug trafficking' and may be concealing
or carrying away the contraband." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94. Nor did
Summers extend the Terry exception to the "evidence gathering"
function:

"individualized probable cause is still a

"prerequisite to an evidence search of any person on the
premises." Broadnaxf
The Summers

654 P.2d at 104.

rule only allows occupants to be "detained"

under a warrant authorizing a search of the premises.

The court

in Summers was careful to make the distinction between a
"detention" and a "search."

It notes:

In this casef only the detention is at issue.
The police knew respondent lived in the house
and they did not search him until after they
had probable cause to arrest him and had done so.
Summers at 676 n.4 (emphasis added).
Deputy Conforti specifically establishes that he was not
searching the Appellant incident to arrest but was searching him
pursuant to the search warrant which was clearly not authorized.
Even assuming the search was not conducted pursuant to the
warrant, there was no evidence to establish probable cause to
arrest the Appellant at the time of the search of his person.
The evidence found on the Appellant during the "more thorough"
search of his person cannot be used to establish probable cause.
"[0]ne cannot search first to gather evidence to establish probable cause needed to justify the initial intrusion.

Otherwise,

the requirement of probable cause to arrest would be turned
upside down."

Broadnax, at 102.

In addition, other evidence eventually found during the
search cannot establish probable cause if it is discovered after
the search of a defendant.

The court in Broadnax found that

the discovery of controlled substances in the bedroom of the
residence could not serve to establish probable cause to arrest
or search the defendant in that case because "that evidence was
found after the search of petitioner had already been completed
and thus could not form the basis for the initial intrusion of
petitioners1 right of privacy."

Id. at 103.

Because the Appellant was searched pursuant to the warrant,
the search of his person was illegal under the well established
rule of Ybarra that an authorized search of a premises does not
likewise authorize the search of a person found on the premises.
Assuming arguendo that the search was not made pursuant to the
warrant, Summers only allows for the "detention" of an individual,
not a "search" and requires that a search be made only incident
to arrest.

In this case, the Appellant was searched before he

was arrested and before probable cause had been established to
arrest him.

Under Ybarra and Summers then, the search of the

Appellant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, therefore the evidence
derived as a result should be suppressed.

III.

THE SEIZURE OF UNITED STATES CURRENCY AND
A SOFT PLASTIC BAG CONTAINING BALLOONS WITH
A POWDERY SUBSTANCE WAS NOT A LEGITIMATE
SEIZURE PURSUANT TO A "PAT DOWN" SEARCH.

The evidence in this case is uncontroverted that officers
from the Metropolitan Narcotics Squad contacted the Appellant
when he arrived at a home where the officers were in the process
of executing a search warrant (R. 285 p. 24). Upon arrival at the
residence in question, the Appellant attempted to make inquiry of
the officers as to what was going on, and he was placed up
against a wall and "patted down" in a search for weapons (R. 168,
R. 285 p. 26). The evidence is further uncontrovered that at
that point the officers pulled a number of bills of United States
currency and a small plastic bag containing approximately 96
balloons each of which contained small amounts of a powdery
substance from the jacket pockets of the Appellant during this
pat-down search (R. 285 p. 26, 28). It is clear that at the time
the Appellant was searched he was not under arrest, since the
police officers had found nothing incriminating prior to the
search of his person, and did not have the name of the Appellant
as an individual for whom they had probable cause to believe had
committed any crime (App. B). It is clear that the act of arrest
had not occurred, but that the officers were merely searching the
Appellant for weapons to protect themselves, a proposition the
lower court clearly ruled on previously in Appellant's favor (R.
149).

It is Appellant's contention that while the officers were

allowed to pat him down to determine whether or not he possessed

a weapon and therefore could be a threat to the officers, that it
was a violation of his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution for them to have seized soft items
which could not possibly have been weapons during this alleged
"pat-down" search (See Judge Wilkinson's Minute Entryf App. C ) .
U.C.A. § 77-7-16 (1953) authorizes a peace officer to frisk
a person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes that he
or any other person is in danger.

This particular statute is an

exception to the general requirement that police obtain a warrant
for all searches.
4th Amend.

See Const. Utah, Art. I, § 14 and U.S. Const.

However, in State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (1986) the

Utah Suoreme Court observed:
"The section (77-7-16) must be interpreted to
meet the constitutional requirements of Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 28 L.Ed 2d
889 (1968). In that case, the Supreme Court
established a narrowly drawn exception to
the requirement that police obtain a warrant
for all searches."
716 P.2d at 292.
In the instant case, Appellant does not dispute the fact
that when he arrived at a scene where the police officers were
executing a search warrant, the police officers had a right to
pat him down pursuant to the standard enunciated by Terry v. Ohio
and U.C.A. § 77-7-16 in order to determine whether or not he
possessed a dangerous weapon which would threaten the safety of
police officers.

Appellant asserts however, that once the police

officers were able to pat him down and determine that he did not

possess a hard object such as a gun or knifef that their search
must have ended at that point.

They were not allowed to feel

soft objects or soft bulges and go into the pockets of Appellant
to obtain evidence.

Even the limited intrusion into the right of

privacy of the Appellant under such warrantless circumstances
allowed by Terry is justified only by the officers1 fear that the
individual may possess a weapon.
In Roybal, the Utah Supreme Court found that a "limited patdown" of defendant's beltline to obtain a weapon that police
officers had reason to believe was concealed behind the defendant's back, was an appropriate seizure considering all of the
facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time the
search was made.

Through this limited search, the officer felt a

hard object which he then pulled out of the defendant's waistband,
and said hard object was a loaded pistol.

(716 P.2d at 292-293).

In Roybal, the Supreme Court clearly established the proposition that, all police officers can dof even when they have
reason to believe that the defendant is armed, is to conduct a
"limited pat-down" to determine whether or not the defendant is
armed.

Counsel has found no Utah Supreme Court case which

directly deals with the situation where a police officer feels a
soft object during this limited pat-down search, but Roybal makes
clear that the purpose of such a limited pat-down search is to
help the officer determine whether or not there is something that
can harm the officer, specifically, a weapon.

Other jurisdic-

tions have dealt directly with the "soft object" issue and have

ruled very squarely in favor of the proposition that a peace
officer who feels a soft object during a limited pat-down search
for weapons cannot remove such soft object without further facts
or circumstances which would justify a search of the Defendant
independent of the search for weapons.
In United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1972)
the Court of Appeals held that where a police officer, in conducting a justifiable frisk for weapons, felt in the handkerchief
pocket of suspect's suitcoat a folded ten dollar bill; the
officer did not have authority under the "pat-down" exception of
Terry v. Ohio to remove the object and inspect its contents, even
though the officer had testified that when he first felt the
object he feared that a knife or possibly a razor blade could
have been contained inside the soft object.

In Tinney v. Wilson,

408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the actions of a police officer whose initial
search for weapons of the defendant who was found in an automobile of a girl arrested for prostitution, although constitutionally valid at its inception, became invalid when the officer
squeezed a small, soft object and then removed such object from
the defendant's pocket, since the search should have been confined in scope to intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for assault on the
officer.
In United States v. Prim, 698 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1983), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case later than Tinney, upheld

its earner ruling and suppressed evidence presented by the prosecution during the course of defendant's narcotics trial where
police officers had obtained a manila envelope containing narcotics when they were merely conducting a pat-down search of the
defendant.

Tn that casef the drug agents had no probable cause

to arrest the defendant, but had reason to believe the defendant
may have been in possession of narcotics.

Therefore, the police

officers used the pretext of a pat-down search to seize the soft
envelope containing a soft powdery substance later identified as
cocaine.

In that case, the Court stated:
" . . . The whole objective of the pat down was
not aimed at a weapon search to protect against
danger as permitted under Terry, but instead
was conducted with the expectation of finding
narcotics. Therefore, there was no justification for a pat-down and the pat-down conducted
exceeded the permissable scope of a weapons
search.
(Citing U.S. v. Del Toro, supra)
Thus, the manila envelope was seized as a
result of an illegal pat-down and should have
been suppressed."
698 F.2d at 977.

In United States v. Gonzales, 319 F.Supp 56 3 (U.S. D.C.
Conn. 1970) the Court held that where a defendant was arrested at
night in a high crime area preparing to exit from a car, it was
possible that he might have tossed a weapon to his friend who was
being arrested and therefore the initial frisk of the defendant
was not unreasonable; but when the officer felt in defendant's
pocket a soft packet wrapped in cellophane, a further search conducted on the theory that there might have been a razor blade

hidden in the packet was unreasonable and the packet containing
heroin was ordered suppressed.

This case has particular signifi-

cance to the instant case in that Appellant's pocket contained a
cellophane bag with soft balloons.

The police officer has never

enunciated a fear that there might have been any sort of object
hidden in the packet; but even if he had done so, the Gonzales
case stands for the proposition that such a fear in a soft object
situation would be unreasonable and the evidence would be
suppressed since it was beyond the limits of the Terry pat-down
search limitations.

See also, U.S. v. Reid, 351 F.Supp 714

(U.S.D.C. Ed. N.Y. 1972).
The state courts have been as consistent as the federal
courts in significantly limiting the scope of pat-down searches.
In People v. Collins, 463 P.2d 403 (Cal. 1970) the court held
that in searching a legally detained individual reasonably
suspected of being armed, a police officer must be limited to a
careful exploration of the outer surfaces of the person's
clothing until and unless he discovers specific and articulable
facts reasonably supporting his suspicion.

The court also held

that the burden of pointing to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences thereto, reasonably
warranted a search of a suspect's clothing, properly rested with
the government.

The Court specifically said:

"Feeling a soft object in a suspect's pocket
during a pat-down, absent unusual circumstances,
does not warrant an officer's intrusion into a
suspect's pocket to retrieve the object. A
pat-down must be confined in scope to an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs or other hidden instruments

for the assault of the police officer.
. . . The obvious purpose of holding that
officers cannot go beyond exploration of the
surfaces of a suspect's clothing without being
able to point to specific and articulable facts
. . . is to ensure that the scope of such a
search cannot be exceeded at the mere discretion of an officerf but only upon discovery of
tactile evidence particularly tending to
corroborate suspicion that the suspect is
armed. To permit officers to exceed the scope
of a lawful pat-down whenever they feel a soft
object by relying upon mere speculation the
object might be a razor blade concealed in a
handkerchief or some other type of atypical
weapon, invites a plenary search of an individual's person. Such a holding would render
meaningless Terry's requirement that pat-downs
be limited in scope absent articulable grounds
for an additional intrusion."
463 P.2d at 406 (emphasis supplied).
The California court in Collins clearly held that an officer
who exceeds a pat-down without first discovering an object which
feels reasonably like a knife, gun, or clubf must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably support
a suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an atypical
weapon which would feel like the object felt during the pat-down.
Only then can judges satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement
of a neutral evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular
search by comparing the facts with the officer's view of those
facts.

See also, Byrd v. Superior Court, 268 Cal.App.2d 49 5;

People v. Britton, 26 4 Cal.App.2d 711.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled accordingly in the case of State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429 (1980).

In

that case, soft items seized from a defendant's pocket were later

determined to be balloons containing heroin.

Again, this case

has particular significance in the instant matter in that we are
dealing specifically with balloons containing a white powdered
substance alleged to be heroin.

In Hobarty, the defendant was

standing on the street when he was recognized by a police officer
as one who had been arrested previously for possession of marijuana and cocaine and for carrying a concealed weapon.

The

officer stated that he knew of the petitioner's prior record and
for his own safety he got out of the car, asked for identification, and "patted" the petitioner for weapons.

He found

none, but did detect in the petitioner's shirt pocket two spongy
objects which he squeezed and concluded were balloons containing
narcotics.

He attempted to reach into the pocket, and removed

the balloons containing heroin only after a scuffle.

The

Washington Supreme Court recognized the exception to the
warrantless search provided in the case of Terry v. Ohio but
pointed out that in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct.
1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) the United States Supreme Court said
that before an officer places a hand on the person of a citizen
in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate,
reasonable grounds for doing so, and that in the case of the selfprotective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the
individual was armed and dangerous.

Id. at 431.

Using this

rationale, the Washington Supreme Court suppressed the evidence
seized from the defendant in that case under the pretext of a pat-

down search.

The Court observed that the police officer's

knowledge of the defendant's prior arrest for carrying a concealed weapon gave him reason to suspect that the defendant was
armed and therefore it was appropriate for him to conduct the
"pat-down" search for weapons.

The Court then went on to say:

"Howeverf from his own description of the search
which he made, it is evident that its scope was
not strictly limited to a search for weapons,
but included also an exploration of the possibility
that the defendant might be in possession of narcotics. Having discovered 'spongy' objects (which
could not reasonably be feared as dangerous weapons)
in the defendant's pockets, the officer squeezed
them with the obvious purpose of ascertaining
whether they had th£ shape and consistency of
balloons commonly used for narcotics. Such a search
reaches beyond the scope permitted under the Fourth
Amendment adding to the search for weapons a search
for evidence of a crime."
617 P.2d at 433, 434 (emphasis added).
The Washington Supreme Court went on to say "we are aware of no
instance in which the Supreme Court has condoned the use of a
frisk to search for evidence of an independent crime. . . To
approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated to weapons
would be to invite the use of weapons' searches as a pretext
for unwarranted searches, and thus to severely erode the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
pared to take."

Such a step this court is not pre-

617 P.2d at 434.

In the instant case, officers reached in Appellant's pocket
and removed a soft cellophane bag containing common balloons with
a powdery substance and soft folding currency.
were retrieved.

No "hard" objects

Appellant maintains that if this Court condones

this warrantless search under the guise of a "pat-down" search,
the door would be opened for police officers to use weapons
searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches for evidence and
would fall squarely within the concerns expressed by every court
that has ever dealt with this issue.
In People v. McCarty, 296 NE.2d 862 (1973) the Appellate
Court of the State of Illinois clearly ruled that where police
officers during a pat-down search for weapons removed a soft
plastic bag from a pocket of the defendant, such seizure was
invalid and the evidence obtained from the soft plastic bag could
not be used against the defendant in trial.

Further, the Court

of Appeals of the State of Georgia in Holtzendorf v. State, 188
SE.2d 879 (1972) ruled that officers who removed marijuana in a
very small plastic bag under a packet of cigarettes from the
shirt of the defendant under the pretext of a pat-down search, had
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and reversed the
conviction and ordered the suppression of such evidence.
Further, in Blackburn v. Florida, 414 SO.2d 651 (1982) the
District Court of Appeals of Florida ruled that "Even assuming a
police officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of
the defendant, it was not permissible for him to seize a stocking
in defendant's shirt pocket, and the arrest of the defendant
based on the seizure of the stocking was invalid, as was the
resulting search of the defendant's automobile."

Further, in

Dunn v. Florida, 382 SO.2d 727 (1980) the District Court of
Appeals of Florida ruled that an officer who, during the course

of a lawful stop and frisk of the defendant, felt an object
suspected to be marijuana, did not have the right to seize it
where the officer had no belief that the object might be a
weapon.

And finally, in People v. Cobbin, 692 P.2d 1069 (Colo.

1984) the Colorado Supreme Court held that once a legitimate patdown search has determined that the suspect is not armed, the
police may not once again search the suspect and confiscate the
contents of his pockets under the guise of said pat-down search.
In addition to the overwhelming weight of case law, Wayne R.
LaFave in his Treatise On The Fourth Amendmenty 2d Ed. 1987,
indicates very clearly that under the prevailing view of evidence
and search and seizure law, "A search is not permissible when the
object felt is soft in nature.

Even if the object felt is hardf

the question is whether its size or density is such that it might
be a weapon."

LaFave at 523 § 9.4(c).

The overwhelming weight of authority on the subject of patdown searches makes clear that police officers may not, during
the course of a Terry stop and frisk situation, remove soft
objects from a suspect's pocket unless thay have some articulable
basis to believe that the object removed is a weapon.

In the

instant case, police officers violated the rights of the
Appellant under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution by seizing
soft objects from his pocket under circumstances where such soft
objects could not possibly have been weapons.

The officers

clearly exceeded the scope of their pat-down search and began an
exploratory search of the Appellant for evidence.

IV.

ALL ALLEGED INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS OF THE
APPELLANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED SINCE APPELLANT
COULD NOT SPEAK ENGLISH WELL ENOUGH TO UNpERSTAND THE NATURE OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS, NgRjTO
ENTER VALID WAIVER THERETO,

In Mij^nda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966 ) f the United States Supreme Court held that
before a custodial interrogation may be conducted with a criminal
suspect, the suspect must be informed of his right to have an
attorney and to have a court-appointed attorney if he could not
afford to hire one.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the

suspect must be informed that everything he says could be used
against him in a court of law and that he has the right to remain
silent.

Finally, the Court ruled that a person must knowingly

and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and to have an
attorney present before he may be interrogated by police officers.

The U.S. Supreme Court clearly held that custodial

interrogations are presumed to be involuntary unless the suspect
is warned of his rights.

In U.S. v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227

(9th Cir. 1978), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
amplified the Miranda language by saying:
"We assume without so holding that if Miranda
warnings are given in a language which the
person being so instructed does not understand, a waiver of those rights would not be
valid. . . ".
588 F.2d at 1235.
There are very few cases dealing with the language problem
involved with the Miranda warning and the waiver of Miranda

rights.

This is undoubtedly due to the fact unac wnere une

government fails to meet its burden of showing that the defendant
clearly and knowingly understood the rights he was being given
and knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, any statement made by the defendant would have to be suppressed.

Any time

police officers deal with a suspect whom they do not believe
speaks good English, they cannot simply assume that he understands the Miranda warning when they read it to him and that a
nod of his head or some other affirmation means that he knowingly
and intelligently waives his right to remain silent.

What police

officers should do when they are dealing with Spanish-speaking
subjects was pointed out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in the case of U.S. v. Elles-Martinez, 761 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1985).

In that case, Spanish-speaking crew members

were arrested by the Coast Guard for smuggling.

After their

arrest, the crew members were informed of their Miranda rights in
Spanish and the officers obtained acknowledgements of the rights
from each defendant.

Furthermore, each defendant was presented

with a Miranda Rights Waiver form in the Spanish language upon
which they individually signed an affirmation of having read and
understood their rights.

Prior to the booking process, they were

again individually informed of their rights in Spanish, and even
though some members of the crew knew some words of English, the
government agents dealing with the defendants realized that in
order to obtain a valid waiver, the defendants must be informed
of their rights in Spanish.

Their extra efforts in placing the

Miranda warning in writing in Spanish and obtaining written
waivers thereof, were sufficient to pass the standards of the
Miranda case and the Ninth Circuit refused to suppress the defendants1 statements on the grounds that the individual defendants
did not understand and voluntarily waive their rights giv€>n to
them in Spanish since it was given to them with a Mexican accent
and they were actually Panamanian.
In the instant case, it is clear that the police officers
ma( e

^

no effort whatsoever to give the Appellant his Miranda

warning in Spanish.

For the officers to testify that they gave

the warning in English and obtained a waiver in English is
clearly insufficient to establish that the Appellant knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In the instant case, officers knew Appellant was a Mexican
citizen who was in the country illegally (R. 285 p.40). They could
tell he had at least some difficulty with the English language
(R.285 p. 79; R.284 p. 26). In Coyote v. U.S., 380 F.2d 305 (10th
Cir. 1967) the U.S. Court of Appealsf Tenth Circuit observed:
"Surely Miranda is not a ritual of words to be
recited by rote according to didactic niceties.
What Miranda does require is meaningful advice
to the unlettered and unlearned in language
which he can comprehend and on which he can
knowingly act. We will not indulge semantical
debates between counsel over the particular
words to inform an individual of his rights.
The crucial test is whether' the words in the
context used, considering the age, background
and intelligence of the individual being
interrogated, impart a clear, understandable
warning of all of his rights."
380 F.2d at 308 (emphasis supplied).

In a subsequent case, U.S. v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th
Cir. 1984), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit indicated that the concept of informing the defendant of his rights
is but one of a two-part procedure required by the Constitution
before statements made by a defendant in a custodial setting may
be introduced as evidence against him in a subsequent trial. The
second step is making certain that the defendant waives his
rights knowingly and intelligently.

The Tenth Circuit, in order

to emphasize their holding in Obregon, opined:
"Law enforcement officials may find it desirable
in the future, in order.to avoid the problem
presented here, to utilize two distinct forms,
one perhaps captioned 'Advice of Rights1 form
setting forth one's rights under Miranda with a
signatory line for acknowledgement that he or she
has read the statement of rights and understands
the same, and a second form perhaps captioned
"Waiver of Rights' (making clear that the defendant
is knowingly and intelligently waiving his or her
Miranda rights). This approach may eliminate any
confusion existing between the concepts of
'understanding rights' and 'waiver of rights'.
748 F.2d at 1381.
It seems very clear then that a defendant who speaks little
if any English cannot be expected to fully and completely understand the Miranda warning, and especially cannot be expected to
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
Another critical reason officers should obtain a knowing
and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights involves the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.

In the recent

case of Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 476, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), Justice White
writing for the majority talked in terms of the waiver of the

right to counsel as being one of the essential elements of the
Miranda warning.

The Court reversed a decision by the Supreme

Court of Arizona and held:
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that
waivers of counsel must not only be voluntaryf
but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilegef a matter which depends in
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience and conduct of the
accused.' (citing cases) . . . We note that in
denying petitioner's motion to suppress, the
trial court found the admission to have been
'voluntary' without separately focusing on
whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently
relinquished his right to counsel."
451 U.S. at 483.
The Supreme Court pointed out in the Edwards decision that
not only should the court's inquiry involving suppression of confessions concern the "voluntariness" of the defendant's statements, but also, whether or not the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel as well as his right to
remain silent.

Even if the defendant understood that he had the

right to remain silent and chose to speak anyway, the court must
also determine whether or not he understood that he had the right
to have counsel present during interrogation, and that one could
be appointed for him if he could not afford to hire one.
In the instant case, it seems clear that even if this Court
were to find that the Appellant had voluntarily decided to make
a statement to police officers, that there must be a showing on
the part of the State that he knowingly and intelligently waived

his right to counsel.

Where, as in the case at bar, the police

officers do not bother to obtain an interpreter for purposes of
being certain the Appellant is understanding what they are
telling him, and where they choose not to have the Appellant
execute a waiver of his Miranda rights in writing in his native
language, the state cannot possibly meet the burden of proving
that the Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived both his
Constitutional right to remain silent and his Constitutional right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

V.

STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER HE
INVOKED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.

As stated earlier, in Miranda v. Arizonay supra, the United
States Supreme Court provided safeguards to protect the constitutional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interrogation.

Unless law enforcement officers give specific warning

prior to questioning and follow specific procedures thereafter,
any statements made by the person in custody are not admissible
at trial even if the statement is voluntary.

Michigan v. Mosley,

423 U.S. 96, 100 (1965).
The issue in this case involved statements made by the
defendant while in custody after being given Miranda warnings.
The procedure to be followed once warnings have been given was
also established in Miranda:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates,
in any manner, at any time, prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease.
Miranda, at 473-74 (emphasis added).
Implicit in this passage is the recognition that renewed
questioning can eventually operate to overcome the will of an
accused.

Left unanswered in Miranda was the question of "under

what circumstances, if any, "would a resumption of questioning be
permissible."

Mosley, at 101.

The court answered this question

i n Mosley concluding that "the admissibility of statements
obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent

depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut-off
questioning1 was 'scrupulously honored."
In

Mosley, at 104.

Mosley, the defendant charged with robbery, was given

Miranda warnings and invoked his right to remain silent by stating
that he did not wish to answer any questions at that time. Two
hours later, after being given a second set of full and complete
Miranda warnings, Mosley was questioned about an unrelated
murder.

The court found that the subsequent questions did not

"undercut" the accused's previous decison because:

(1) a "fresh"

set of warnings were given and (2) the questioning concerned an
"unrelated" offense.

Mosely at 105.

The issue in this case then turns on whether the Appellant's
right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" as required by
Miranda and Mosley. Under Mosley, resumed questioning must be
accompanied by a "fresh" set of warnings and must be "unrelated"
to the charged offense.
In response to being given Miranda warnings, the Appellant
in this case clearly invoked his right to remain silent by
stating that "he did not wish to answer questions at that time."
(R.284 p. 28; R. 163). Five minutes later, without new Miranda
warnings, Deputy Conforti resumed questioning the Appellant.
asked "How long have you been living in this house?"

He

(R. 170-171).

To which the Appellant responded that "he had been living there
approximately six months and that he and the other two that had
arrived with him were illegal aliens from Mexico." (R. 171).
Then the officer asked which "other two" he was referring to as

they had arrested five persons that night

(R. 171).

An hour and a half later en route to the jail, Deputy
Labrum again resumed extensive interrogation without new Miranda
warnings.

The following questions were asked:

(1) How much

Appellant was paying for rent; (2) If he had any idea how much he
made from the sale of heroin; (3) How much Appellant felt he had
made over the last six months from the sale of heroin while he
had been at that residence (R. 283 p. 102); (4) What he was going
to do with the money; (5) Why he didn't send (to Mexico) s;mall
parts of the money a little bit at a time to his relatives; and
(6) Why he was sending it all at once (R. 283 p. 102).
These questions were not preceded by a "fresh set of
warnings" nor were they "unrelated" to the offense the Appellant
was charged with as required under Mosley.

Therefore, the

Appellant's right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored.
Moreover, these questions were clearly designed to "elicit
an incriminating response."

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U„S. 291

(1980); Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir.

1984).

If an

incriminating response is made in response to any type of
interrogation, after a defendant has invoked his right to remain
silent, it is inadmissible.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436,

473-474 (196); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980); Anderson
v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1984).

Voluntary statements not

made in response to interrogation are admissible.
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

Rhode Island

In Innis, the United States

Supreme Court established the standard for determining when

resumed questioning constitutes "interrogation" requiring a fresh
set of warnings:
The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent.
That is to sayf the term 'interrogation1 under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to words or actions on the part of
police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.
Innis, at 300-301 (emphasis added).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Anderson v. Smithf supraf applied the Innis standard in finding
that the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was
violated by resumed questioning.

Anderson at 103.

In that case,

the state argued that the defendant's statements were voluntary
because he "obviously" knew how to invoke his right to remain
silent having done so previously.

:id. at 102. The burden is not

on the accused to invoke his right a second time however.
"[Slcrupulously honoring a suspect's right
for a few hours does not lessen the impact
of subsequent coercive questioning. The
police must honor the suspect's rights at
all times."
Id. at 103.
In the instant case, Deputy Conforti specifically states
that the statements made by the defendant were not volunteered
but were "in response to a question."

(R. 170-171).

These

questions then constitute an "interrogation" under the Innis

standard as they were clearly designed to "elicit an incriminating response" concerning the very subject on which the
Appellant had invoiced his right to remain silent.
103.

Anderson, at

Innis prohibits this kind of questioning without the safe-

guards provided by Miranda.

Therefore the statements were taker

in violation of the Appellant's Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent and should be suppressed.
At the trial of this matter, the court persisted in u s
rulings that statements by the Appellant after he had invoked his
Constitutional right to remain silent should not be admissible in
the State's case in chief.

However, after the Appellant was

called as a witness to testify on his own behalf at the trial,
the prosecuting attorney asked questions of him on crossexamination and later presented previously ruled involuntary statements of the Appellant to a Detective Jay Labrum on the way to
jail that night, as rebuttal evidence against the Appellant (R.
283 p. 88-102).

Appellant's counsel strenuously objected to the

introduction of such evidence (R. 28 3 p. 87). The court however,
ruled that Detective Labrum's testimony regarding the involuntary
statements of the Appellant would be admissible for rebuttal and
impeachment purposes.
Although the Appellant cannot quarrel with the general rule
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), Appellant argues
that Harris allowed impeachment by the use of these unmirandized
statements only for purposes of attacking credibility and not as

evidence of his guilt.

In fact, in Harris, the jury was

instructed that it could consider the Appellant's prior inconsistent statements "only in passing on (his) credibility and not
as evidence of his guilt".

Harris, supra, at 223.

In the instant case, the jury was not so instructed by the
court and thus, the jury may have used the unmirandized statement
of Appellant to Officer Labrum for purposes of determining his
guilt and not for purposes of simply attacking his credibility.
In addition, Appellant steadfastly denied that he had ever said
such things to Officer Labrum, nor that he was capable of saying
such things to Labrum since he did not understand English well
enough to be able to do so (R. 283 p. 58, 59).
Further, Appellant submits that his testimony generally
denying the crime in question did not open the door for the prosecution to bring in specific testimony it brought in through
Officer Labrum.

VI.

DEFENDANT AYALA'S STATEMENTS WERE "FRUIT OF
THE POISONOUS TREE" AND SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.

An additional issue to be confronted by the Court involves
the fact that the statements made by the Appellant regarding
controlled substances came after police officers violated his
Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution and his
rights under Art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, in that the alleged patdown search exceeded the limitations allowed by Terry v. Ohio
as indicated in Points If II and III of this Brief.

In Oregon v.

Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985) the U.S. Supreme Court clearly held
that evidence discovered as a result of a search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from evidence when the
fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation is a confession.

The Court

pointed out that where a Fourth Amendment violation taints the
confession, a finding of voluntariness for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment is merely a threshhold requirement in determining
whether the confession may be admitted into evidence andf beyond
that, the prosecution must show a sufficient break in events to
undermine the inference that the confession was caused by the
Fourth Amendment violation.

The Court once again reiterated the

principle that the Miranda case stands for the proposition that
there is a presumption of coercion in any custodial interrogation
setting, and it is the duty of the prosecution to remove the presumption by showing the defendant has been appropriately advised
of his Miranda rights and has knowingly and intelligently waived

them.

See also, Wong-Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471.

The statements allegedly made by the Appellant in the aboveentitled matter are statements which apparently resulted from the
fact that police officers had located a quantity of items which
they believed to be heroin.

The Appellant was then placed in the

position of attempting to explain the circumstances andf despite
the fact that he understood very little English, attempted to do
so to the police officers.

These statements of the Appellant

were clearly the result of the impermissible search of his person
by police officers and therefore should be suppressed on the
ground that they were "fruit of the poisonous tree".
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Appellant requests that the Court reverse his
conviction and order the Third District Court to dismiss the case
against him, or to grant him a new trial.

If a new trial is

granted, Appellant requests that the Court enter an Order indicating that the 96 balloons containing a white powdery substance
identified as heroin and $1,320.00 in cash seized from his jacket
pockets be excluded from evidence in his new trial.

In addition,

Appellant requests that the Court enter an Order indicating that
all statements made by him after he invoked his right to remain
silent, and particularly, his statements to Officer Labrum,
should be suppressed and excluded from his new trial.
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T.l. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Offite Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City r Utah
84111
Phone:
(801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE

DEPARTMENT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) : ss
)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH

BEFORE:

Eleanor ~VaTr-5<Mrve-r
JUDGE

The undersigned

affiant being

That he has reason
That

WARRANT

450 South 2nd East
ADDRESS
first duly sworn, deposes and says:

to believe

(X) on the premises known as 8853
yellow brick, yellow wood on
sides and a split entry.

Julia Lane (3255 South),
front.
White siding on

In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State
is now certain property or evidence described as:

of Utah,

there

Heroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices.
and

that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense;
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct.
[Mete
requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]

Affiant
believes
the
property
and
evidence
described
above
is
evidence of the crimefs) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
[STENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to'establish
are:

the grounds for issuance of a Search

*t
' ****

Your affiant, a defective with the Salt Lake County s % * ,
Narcotics Unit states:
*
Your affiant made arrangements for a Confidential !*-for*wU
to make a controlled drug buy at the residence of 8853 J u U s 'moc^
^_ Salt Lake County. The C.I. was given a body search by detecti r i | L.
\\ the Narcotics Unit, under the direction of your affiant. j£\
^ 7 controlled substances or U.S. currency were found. Your affia~- ^ ^ ^
!4^^ave the C.I. a predetermined amount of money.
t>V ^ ; )
Within the last seven (7) days the C.I. was transport.
&J*the area of 8853 Julia Lane.
The C I . was observed enteri-;J ^T
/^vresidence and exit it a short time later; times being record* £ 7
v x
,your affiant. The C.I. was never out of the visual contact
(^i^f
"'for when inside the residence of 8853 Julia Lane) of the affiant
^j[
other detectives. The C.l. turned over to your affiant a q u a n t a , pt(*
heroin that the C.I. stated had been purchased inside the resi<S~, #
The heroin was field tested and flashed positive by u s e
°* -Mt<_
Beetin-Dickinson Field Test Kit. The C . L was again gaven a c o m : ^ t >
body search and no controlled substances or U.S. currency were foun*
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidently
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from *»
unnamed source)
., n
Another C.I> has stated that drugs, specifically heroin t%
and has ~ STen sold" out of the residence of 8853 Julia Lane for sc*#
t ime.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a'Search Warrant be issued for th*
seizure of said items:
(X) at any time day or night because there t* reason t*
believe it is necessary to seize the property VTlor t 0 lt
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for
other good reasons, to-wit:
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executHf
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the otticer *
authority or purpose because:
(X) physical harm nay result to any person if notice were
given; or
..
.
(X) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposes
of, or secreted.

PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

This danger is beHjWfee<h-Tcr^e^l st because:
Another C^T-*—h*-s~""seen on different occasions weapons Inside
the residence and knows that & handgun is inside the residence*

AFFIAN:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORtf TO BEFORE ME this

r

y,#&A;

'fc lajc^o f January, 1986.

-xo/>-7//<
/~

y -^'"'U

r-

S^

V
i Ci

JUDGE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

T.L; "TED" CANNON
County Attorney
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy County* Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Phone:
(801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 5
SEARCH

STATE OF UTAH

WARRANT
No.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer

in the State of Utah.

Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
John Conforti - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Narcotics Division, I am
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

(X) on the premises known as 88S3
yellow brick, yellow wood on
sides and a split entry.

Julia Lane (3255 South),
front.
White siding on

In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State
is now certain property or evidence described as:

of Utah,

there

4eroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices.
and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense;
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the
illegal conduct.
[Note requirements cf Utah Code

Annotated,

77-23-3(2)]

Affiant
believes
the
property
and e v i d e n c e
described
above
is
e v i d e n c e of t h e c r i m e ( s ) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
[NTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE,

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to
make
a <search
of
the
above-named
or
described
person(s)f
v e h i c l e ( s ) , and p r e m i s e s f o r the h e r e i n - a b o v e d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y o r
e v i d e n c e and i f you f i n d t h e same or any p a r t t h e r e o f , to b r i n g i t
f o r t h w i t h b e f o r e «e a t t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t C o u r t , County of S a l t Lake,
S t a t e of U t a h , or r e t a i n s u c h p r o p e r t y in your c u s t o d y , s u b j e c t t o
t h e o r d e r of t h i s c o u r t .
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated

this

January,

JUDGE

1986.

IRCUIT COURT
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